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THE MONTANA DEAD MAN STATUTE
A party to a civil action at common law was never competent as a
witness.' The law, as Baron Gilbert stated "removes them from testimony,
to prevent their sliding into perjury" because " (i)t is . . . easy for
persons, who are prejudiced and prepossessed, to put false and unequal
glosses upon what they give in evidence." 2 Such disqualification of the
parties for interest was completely abolished in England in the mid-nine-
teenth century and has been done away with in the United States with
but one exception. 3 That exception limits the testimony which an inter-
ested person may give in action prosecuted or defended by the representa-
tive of a decedent's estate and is embodied in the so-called Dead Man
statutes.
Montana's Dead Man statute renders incompetent as witnesses:
"Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or
persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against
an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against the
estate of a deceased person, as to the facts of direct transactions
or oral communications between the proposed witness and the de
ceased, excepting when the executor or administrator first intro-
duces evidence thereof, or when it appears to the court, that with-
out the testimony of the witness, injustice will be done."'
The Montana Supreme Court in language reminiscent of Baron Gil-
bert's has stated that the statute has a twofold purpose: (1) "to prevent
the living party, by reason of the death of his adversary, gaining an undue
advantage over the administrator" and (2) "to remove the temptation
for the commission of a party by perjury."'5
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
"Against the estate" The Montana statute is at variance with the
Dead Man statutes of other jurisdictions in that it is limited to actions
against the estate.6 The survivor is not to be disqualified as a witness
when he defends an action brought by the estate.7 The wisdom of such a
limitation is questionable, assuming that the logic of the Dead Man
rule is valid, because the survivor will be guided by self interest be he
plaintiff or defendant. He is equally capable in either case to take ad-
vantage of the estate's personal representative.
"Persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted"
The statute is clear in proscribing the testimony of parties or assignors
12 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, section 575 (3rd ed. 1940).
2GILBERT, EVIDENCE, 119 (1727).
3MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE, section 65 (1954).
'R.C.M., section 93-701-3 subd. 3.
'Leffek v. Leudeman, 95 Mont. 457, 463, 27 P.2d 511 (1933).
6"Most of the statutes . . . read [in substance]: 'In an action by or against the
state' . . "' HALE, The California "Dead Man's Statute," 9 So. Cal. L. Rev. 35,
42 (1935).
'The Dead Man statute "applies only to parties . . . proceedings against an execu-
tor or administrator . . . ." Wilcox v. Schissler, 55 Mont. 246, 257, 175 P. 889 (1918).
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of parties. But who are the "persons in whose behalf ... [the] action
. * . is prosecuted" to whom the statute also applies? The Montana Su-
preme Court has considered the problem but once, holding, that the
statute did not prohibit a wife from testifying in behalf of her plaintiff
husband. The Court stated that the statute excluded only those persons
having a "direct legal or pecuniary interest." The wife was a competent
witness because she bad "no direct right growing out of the marital
relationship . . . [which would] attach to the money recovered .. ."I
California came-to a similar conclusion in holding that a witness was
competent unless his interest amounted to an existing property right.
"Action or proceeding" A witness is not incompetent under the Dead
Man statute unless his testimony is to be presented within the course of
an action or proceeding. It is clear that a motion is not an action' ° and
California stated that a motion is not to be considered a proceeding within
the meaning of its Dead Man statute."
A counterclaim or cross-claim against an estate is an action or pro-
ceeding within the meaning of the Montana statute.' 2 Should a plain-
tiff, however, bring an action to which the estate lodges a counterclaim
a curious paradox arises. Since the statute's provisions are limited to
actions against the estate, the plaintiff may testify as to the estate's coun-
terelaim but is incompetent to testify with regard to his own claim. What
ruling, then, should be made on the admissibility of the plaintiff's testi-
mony if the claim and counterclaim arise out of the same occurrence or
transaction? Montana has not decided the question but may well be guided
by the California ruling that should claim and counterclaim involve
the same transaction, plaintiff's testimony is admissible but only to re-
fute defendant's counterclaim; his testimony will not be considered to
prove his own claim.'8 To ensure that plaintiff's testimony to the trans-
action is offered only in rebuttal, it will be admitted only after the estate
has given evidence making out the counterclaim. 14
"Claim or demand" A witness is not incompetent under the statute
unless his testimony is to be presented to prove a claim or demand. The
words claim or demand have been interpreted quite broadly. Both terms
apply to "all sorts of causes of action against the estates of dead men,
whether for money claims or for property which, but for the establish-
ment of the claim or demand, would belong to the estate."'' California,
'Novak v. Novak, 141 Mont. 312, 315, 377 P.2d 367 (1963).
'Dennis v. Brown, 62 Cal. App. 439, 216 P. 977 (1923). The California Dead Man
statute contained the identical provision.
'"State ex rel. MeVay v. District Court, 126 Mont. 382, 251 P.2d 840 (1953).
"Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.2d,144, 173 P.2d 657 (1946).
"See Walsh v. Kennedy, 115 Mont. 551, 147 P.2d 497 (1938); Langston v. Curry,
95 Mont. 57, 26 P.2d 160 (1933).
"George v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414, 150 P. 73 (1915).
'Id.
'5Delmoe v. Long, 35 Mont. 139, 152, 88 P. 778 (1907).
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in contrast, viewed the words claim or demand in its recently repealed
Dead Man statute as encompassing only suits for the recovery of a money
judgement. 16 The California Court held, accordingly, that actions to quiet
title or to establish a trust do not involve claims or demands. 1 Montana
has rejected this narrow interpretation' s and properly so because the
threat of perjury is not significantly affected by the nature of the par-
ticular action.
"Direct transactions or oral communications" It must be emphasized
that a witness is not incompetent under the statute unless he seeks to
testify to direct transactions or oral communications with the decedent.
This limitation is a significant departure from the much broader original
Montana Dead Man statute which proscribed testimony "to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of . . . [decedent]."' 9
Direct transactions within the meaning of the Montana statute in-
clude contracts, business agreements, legal services, and even the witnessing
of a homicide perpetrated by deceased . 0 The Court has yet to decide,
however, the controversial question of whether an automobile accident is
a transaction within the meaning of the Dead Man statute. The majority
of courts hold in the affirmative, thereby rendering the survivor incompe-
tent to testify to the circumstances of the accident.2' The minority, in-
terpreting Dead Man statutes applicable only to "personal" transactions,
have rejected this construction.2 2 Hence, the Montana Court, when con-
fronted with the question, will have to determine whether the term "direct
transaction" includes "accidental physical interaction[s]" as well as
"subjective, mental, planned interaction[s]. ' '23 Should the Court follow
the precedent of Anderson v. Wirkman24 in which the witnessing of a
homicide was deemed a "direct transaction," it may well favor the broader
construction. In view of the policy underlying the Dead Man statute,
however, the term "direct transaction" would seem intended "to include
only personal dealings of a type which are unlikely to be witnessed by
disinterested observers and concerning which the estate would be hard
pressed to present testimony in explanation or rebuttal. "25 Automobile
accidents should not be termed "direct transactions" in this sense.
"6Estate of McCausland, 52 Cal. 568. (1878).
"Poulsen v. Stanley, 122 Cal. 655, 55 P. 605 (1898).
I'Delmoe v. Long, supra, note 15.
"The original Dead Man statute was amended by Section 1, Ch. 66, L. 1909.-
"See Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 512, 227 P.2d 614 (1951); Pincus v: Pincus' Es-
tate, 95 Mont. 375, 26 P.2d 986 (1933); Harwood v. Scott, 57 Mont. 83, 186 P.
693 (1920); Anderson v. Wirkman, 67 Mont. 176, 215 P. -224 (1923).
'Maciejzak v. Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P.2d' 31 (1931) ; In re Mueller's Estate,
166 Neb. 268, 89 N.W.2d 268 (1958).
--Turbot v. Repp, 247 Iowa 69, 72 N.W.2d 565 (1955); Shaney v. Blizzard, 209 Md.
304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956).
'This language which so aptly differentiates the two types of transactions is taken
from 16 Okla. L. Rev. 105, 107 (1963).
21Supra, note 20.
'159 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 675 (1959).
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Exceptions There are two exceptions to the general prohibition of the
statute. First, the plaintiff may testify to transactions with decedent if
the decedent's personal representative introduces evidence of that trans-
action.26 Second, the trial court may in its discretion permit the plaintiff
to testify if without such testimony injustice will be done. While the
operation of the first exception is clear, that of the second exception is
riot, and the discussion will be limited to the latter.
Under what circumstances, can the trial court properly determine
that injustice will be done if the plaintiff is not permitted to testify
to his transaction with decedent? The early cases held that plaintiff was
a competent witness if, without his testimony, he would be unable to
make out a prima facie case.-7 In Roy v. King's Estate,2 for example,
the trial court sustained defendant's objection that plaintiff was in-
competent to testify to his transaction with decedent. The Supreme
Court affirmed because "it is lodged in the sound discretion of the trial
court to determine in each case ...whether the testimony is necessary
to enable the plainliff to make out a prima facie case, and thus prevent
injustice ... [T]he court did not abuse its discretion . . .for there was
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case without plaintiff's
testimony." Operation of the rule is well exemplified by Anderson v.
Wirkman .2-  There one Jacob Maki killed plaintiff's husband and coin-
mitted suicide. Plaintiff, the only witness to the killing, sued Maki's
estate for wrongful death. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff was
properly allowed to testify because "her cause of action would have been
defeated by excluding the testimony of the only witness who could
detail the facts and circumstances tending to prove that the killing was
wrongful."
The later cases rejected this early rule and substituted another-
that plaintiff would be allowed to testify only if he first produced
foundation evidence which showed that his claim was in all probability
meritorious30 Hence, in Langston v. Curry3 ' the Court affirmed a ruling
rejecting plaintiff's testimony because the evidence at the time of ob-
jection to plaintiff's testimony could be construed to be insufficient
to show that plaintiff "had in all probability . . . a meritorious cause of
action, and in the absence of such a foundation, this court is unable to
say that the trial court abused its discretion . . .". The same rule was
"'Here there was no testimony introduced in behalf of the executor .... Therefore
the first exception of the statute is not involved." Cox v. Williamson, supra, note
20.
'Rowe v. Eggum, 107 Mont. 378, 87 P.2d 189 (1938); Wunderlich v. Holt, 86 Mont.
260, 283 P. 423 (1929); Anderson v. Wirkman, supra, note 20; Roy v. King's Es-
tate, 55 Mont. 567, 179 P. 821 (1919).
2Id. 55 Mont. at 573.
2Supra, note 20, at 180.3ONovak v. Novak, supra, note 8; Johnson v. Mammoth Load & Uranium Exploration
Corp., 136 Mont. 420, 348 P.2d 267 (1960); Mowbray v. Mowbray, 131 Mont. 580,
312 P.2d 995 (1957); Langston v. Curry, supra, note 12.
T1Supra, note 12, at 72.
[Vol. 30
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stated even more clearly in the recent case of Johnson v. Mammoth Load
& Uranium Exploration Corp.3 as follows: "[B] efore a witness, who is
declared to be incompetent by this statute will be allowed to testify
to prevent an injustice, a foundation must be laid which shows that in
all probability the proponent has a meritorious cause of action."
One question then remains: when will the Montana Supreme Court
find that plaintiff has presented a sufficient foundation to show that
his claim is in all probability meritorious? The Court "has never laid
down a well defined line of demarcation between a sufficient and in-
sufficient foundation. '33 The foundation evidence must be corroborative
of the offered testimony of the witness.3 4 It need not, however, amount
to a prima facie case.3 5 This author submits, that the Supreme Court will
not reverse a ruling allowing plaintiff's testimony, provided that there
is some corroborative foundation evidence which is independent of plain-
tiff's own testimony. The author further submits that the Court will
riot reverse a ruling disallowing plaintiff's testimony no matter how
strong the foundation evidence appears to be. In other words, the Su-
preme Court allows the trial court almost absolute discretion because
it has "the advantage of observing the witnesses during their testimony
and [is] in a better position . ..to determine whether or not injustice
would result if the plaintiff were not permitted to testify."3 6 Hence,
a foundation that appears weak will be found sufficient if the trial court
permitted the plaintiff to testify.3 7 For example in Novak v. Novak,", the
Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court's ruling allowing plain-
tiff's testimony, although the only foundation was that of plaintiff's wife
who testified to conversations she had overheard between her husband
and decedent. A foundation that appears adequate will be found in-
sufficient if the trial court did not permit the plaintiff to testify. 9
An example is Cox v. Williamson,0 in which plaintiff sought specific
performance of an alleged contract which bound decedent to leave $5,000
to plaintiff, if plaintiff would care for him during his lifetime. Disin-
terested witnesses testified that plaintiff worked for decedent for a
minimal salary and that decedent had often stated that he would leave
plaintiff $5,000. The Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court's
ruling that plaintiff was an incompetent witness. Should the trial
court find such testimony of decedent's declarations against interest
3 Supra, note 30, at 423.
'Sharp v. Sharp, 115 Mont. 35, 39, 139 P.2d 235 (1943).
UJohnson v. Mammoth Load & Uranium Exploration: Corp., supra, note 30. The
Court held that the trial court erred in admitting plaintiff's testimony because there
was "absolutely no evidence, independent of the testimony of the plaintiff, which
corroborate[d] the existence of an express contract . .. .
'Sharp v. Sharp, supra, note 33; Rowe v. Eggum, supra, note 27.
36Novak v. Novak, supra, note 8, at 316.
=Id.
'sSupra, note 8.
"See Cox v. Wiliamson, supra, note 20; Mowbray v. Mowbray, supra, note 30.
'Supra, note 20.
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:an insufficient foundation, the Supreme Court will invariably deprecate
the quality of such evidence. 4 1 The Court will readily affirm, however,
if the trial court finds such declarations a sufficient foundation. 42 Hence,
it would appear that the trial court abuses its discretion only should
it permit the plaintiff to testify without first presenting any foundation
evidence whatsoever.
43
Waiver" A plaintiff's incompetency under the Dead Man statute may
be waived in two ways. There is a waiver if the executor or administrator
introduces evidence of plaintiff's direct transactions or oral communi-
cations with decednt. 44 There is also a waiver if the personal repre-
sentative makes no objection to plaintiff's testimony.45 In such a ease
the Supreme Court will presume that the trial court properly exercised
its discretion in allowing the testimony. 46
CONCLUSION
The Dead Man rule "is deplorable in every respect; for it is based
on a fallicious and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more false
decision than it prevent . . .,.47 This statement aptly summarizes the
prevailing opinion toward Dead Man statutes. It is felt that these
statutes unjustly penalize the living for the benefit of the dead on the
unfounded ground that most men will be corrupted by their interest. 48
III the majority of instances, however, courts feel that "the witnesses
are honest, however much interested .. .,.4s Therefore, the statutes defeat
honest claims when the survivor has no witness other than himself.
"Cox v. Williamson, supra, note 30; Langston v. Currie, supra, note 12. The Arizona
Court has held declarations against interest an insufficient foundation for the ad-
mission of testimony by a party to the action as to a transaction between himself
and decedent. Johnson v. Moilanen, 23 Ariz. 86, 201 P. 634 (1921).
"See Noiak v. Novak, supra, note 8; Ahlquist v. Pinski, 120 Mont. 335, 185 P.2d
499 (1947); cf. Sharp v.* Sharp, supra, note 33.
"'This is precisely the kind of case where . . . the statute should prevent the plain-
tiff from testifying . ... . There is absolutely no foundation . . . . " Johnson v. Man
moth Load 4" Uranium Exploration Corp., supra, note 30; See Bauer v. Monroe,
117 Mont. 306, 158 P.2d 485 (1945).
"Anderson v. Wirkman, supra, note 20; The plaintiff is.an incompetent witness ''un-
less the defendant waives the incompetency, which he may do, as provided in the
first exception . . . . ' Roy v. King's Estate, supra, note 27.
"Walsh v. Kennedy, supra, note 12.
'O[N]o . . . objection was made to the testimony . . . either at the trial or upon
appeal, and we cannot be the trial court in error concerning it. Presumably the
court's discretion was properly exercised . . .-.' Walsh v. Kennedy, supra, note 12.
T2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, section .578 _(3rd ed; 1940); 
11Id.; MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE" section 65 (1964).. "Statutes which exclude testi-
mony on:-this -ground are of doubtful expediency. There are more honest claims
defeated by them, by destroying the 'evidence to .piove :such claim, than there would
be ficticious claims established if all enactments were swept away and all persons
rendered competent witnesses." St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930
(1895).
"MORGAN and others, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM, 2-4
(1927). 'To assume that . . . many false claims would be established by perjury
is to place an eiti'eniefly 16iwestilnhtebl human nature,: and a very high estimate
human ingenuity and adroitness." St. John v. Lofland, supra, note 48. • .
[Vol:. 30
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Moreover, the statutes work a worse penalty on the honest than on
the dishonest survivor because "[o]ne who would not stick at perjury
will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not be
disqualified, to swear to the false story."50 Most commentators believe
the jury competent to give the surviver's testimony the weight it
deserves.51 Skillful cross-examination, moreover, will foil the fraudulent
claimant.5 2
The Montana Dead Man statute is not exempt from such criticism.
The statute, as interpreted, penalizes the living at the expense of the
dead. The honest plaintiff may testify only after the presentation of
evidence showing that his claim is in all probability meritorious. His
claim is, therefore, defeated if there was no witness to the transaction.
The injustice of the rule is clearly illustrated by applying it to the facts
of Anderson v. Wirkman.5 3 There decedent killed plaintiff's husband and
committed suicide, Plaintiff, the only witness to the killing, sued
decedent's estate for wrongful death. Had the court then required
foundation evidence showing the killing wrongful, plaintiff could not
have recovered for she was the only witness. Happily the case was an
early one and the old rule was in force-plaintiff was allowed to testify
because she could not otherwise have proved a prima facie case.5 4
Legislatures in several states, recognizing the inadequacy of the
Dead Man rule, have attempted to solve the problem through statutes
based on an American Bar Association recommendation. That recom-
miendation would remove the disqualification of the survivor as a witness
and permit the introduction of declarations of decedent, on a finding
by the trial judge that they were made in good faith and on decedent's
personal knowledge. 6 The exception from the: hearsay rule compensates
the decedent's estate for the disadvantage of the survivor's competency.
This solution has been greatly praised 5' and appears clearly preferable
to Montana's present statute.
CARL F. ROEHL, JR.
50MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE, section 65 (1954).
u'TAFT, COMMENTS ON WILL CONTESTS IN NEW YORK, 30 Yale L.J. 593, 605, (1921);
MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE, section 65 (1954).
52Id.
5Supra, note 20.
5IThe old rule, however, has not been free from criticism: "In Montana . . . the
decisions suggest the curious restriction that interested testimony is admissible only
when needed to make a case for the jury. Lack of corroboration can hardly be sup-
posed to make the survivor more creditable, and if this rule is based on necessity,
the mere existence of a prima facie case should not exclude evidence which may be
essential to secure a verdict." 46 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 836 (1933).
California has recently adopted a statute based on this recommendation. See West's
Ann. Cal. Evid. Code, section 1261.
-(1938) 63 A.B.A. REP. 597, Appendix, Proposal No. 1.5 LADD, THE DEAD MAN STATUTE: SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS AND A LEGISLATIVE PRO-
POSAL, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 207 (1940), at 239; MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE, section 65
1954).
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